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such goals as no hunger, poverty reduction, gender equity, 
welfare and health require the relevant institutions of the 
social sector. 
The institutional quality in Ukraine is the issue regard-
ing the ability for further progress. In 2017 Ukraine took 
the 81st place among 137 countries by the global competi-
tiveness index. Currently, Ukraine has a 128th place in the 
protection of the property rights that may be considered as 
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Abstract. Today the prevention of global challenges (from global security to the problems of poverty) relates to the institutional 
quality. Nowadays, the social standards or other “social rules” make the part of the market system, since they are built into the 
country’s institutional structure. Neither social nor economic reforms can be implemented without the support through insti-
tutional mechanisms. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between social sector institutions and basic institutions, taking into ac-
count the economic development of countries and the way in which they are formed.
A number of empiric studies confirmed significant role of institutions to provide conditions for economic development.  In order 
to define and assess the link between the basic institutions and the social sector institutions, we formed panel data that includes 
20 countries for the period from 2007-2014. We assessed  quality of the basic institutions using The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI). WGI methodology provides an evaluation of six dimensions of the institutional quality that enables to define 
the connection and the impact of every dimension on the institutional quality of the social sector.
The model additionally evaluates the impact of the incomes distribution inequality, general economic welfare on the institu-
tional quality of the social sector. Among all dimensions of governance “Rule of Law” and “Regulatory Quality” the statistically 
significant direct impact on the institutional quality of the social sector has been revealed. It confirms the complementarity of 
basic institutions and institutions of the social sector.
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Introduction
Today the sustainable development goals are on the agenda 
of the international community. Institutional changes can 
play significant role in their achievement. According to 
IMF estimates (IMF, 2005), GDP per capita of sub-Saharan 
Africa might be expected to rise about 85 percent if  the 
institutional quality enhances  to the level of developing 
Asia. Among SDGs the most are of the social nature. Thus, 
a low quality of the basic institutions, which form the insti-
tutional structure (WEF 2018). The negative factors to run 
business include corruption, political instability, the insta-
bility of governments, ineffective state bureaucracy, lack of 
workers’ education, workers’ bad ethics, insufficient ability 
to innovations, restrictive regulation of the labour market, 
inappropriate infrastructure quality, low health quality. The 
demonstrated evaluations prove that most problems relate 
to the institutions’ quality in general and particularly to the 
problems of the social sector. That is why investigating the 
institutional quality problem we focus on the social aspects. 
Formation of new institutions is a conscious attempt 
to improve social consequences, to create social welfare. 
However, the question appears: will the institutions func-
tion effectively? How they are implemented in the current 
institutional structure? We suppose that the answer to this 
question should be found in the institutions’ complemen-
tarity. So, we will try to find out how institutions of the 
social sector and key dimensions of governance are inter-
connected, based on the proposed methodology to evaluate 
the institutional quality of the social sector (Vasilyeva et al. 
2018a, Bagmet and Haponova 2018). 
Literature  review section provides the analysis of con-
temporary results of researches on institutional quality and 
complementarity of institutions. We use panel data analysis 
including Pooled OLS estimators, Fixed effects estimator 
and Random effects models in oder to prove our hypothesis. 
The chosen methodology and data is describe in relevant 
section. The “results” section contains the results of the 
calculations and their explanations. Conclusions section 
contains the conclusions of the study of their decline in 
the context of the results of other researches on this issue.
1. Literature review
While studying the institutional quality, we found several 
aspects, which the quality of institutions is associated with:
– the efficiency of institutions, their impact on eco-
nomic growth;
– the regulatory role of institutions (institutions of 
regulation and their impact on the development);
– complementarity of institutions and institutional 
changes.
The institutions’ efficiency, i.e. their impact on the eco-
nomic growth or economic development, is the most ac-
tively studied topic in the context of the institutional qual-
ity. It is traditionally believed that the institutional quality 
and economic development strengthen each other in the 
long-term perspective. While studying the relationships 
between institutional quality and economic development, 
Bruinshoofd (2016) concluded that the institutional qual-
ity enables countries to achieve the long-term income con-
vergence, since the high quali taty institutions  stimulate the 
economic progress through the creation of conditions which 
assist in the technological changes and innovations accept-
ance. Thus, he supposes that in the cooperation of two driving 
forces “economic development – institutional quality” the 
institutional quality is a starter mechanism, which increases 
this cooperation and forms preconditions for the structural 
development and long-term increase of the welfare.
Acemoglu D. Johnson S. Robinson J. A. (2005) argued 
that distinctions in economic institutions are the main cause 
of different models of economic growth. At the same time 
it is vital to protect property rights, provide equality in op-
portunities, safety.
The institutional quality impact on the economic 
growth, as a rule, is defined via peculiarities of the social 
and economic models of different countries, particularly, 
changes in the transition economies (Melnyk et al. 2018), 
Redek and Susjan (2005). Chousa et al. (2005), Vitola and 
Senfelde (2015) evaluated the institutional system’s devel-
opment in transition economies and the impact it has on 
economic performance. Using operational indicator of in-
stitutional system dynamics they proved dependence be-
tween institutional changes and economic growth in transi-
tion economies. The problems to improve the institutions 
and economies’ functioning in the transition countries are 
studied by Efendica and Pugh (2015) and Efendica et al. 
(2010), Draskovi et al. (2017), Kyrychenko et al. (2018), 
Rivera Rios et al. (2018). Pilia (2017) proved in her work 
that the economic growth of the countries in the transition 
period depends on the chosen model of economic develop-
ment. Harold et al. (2018) gave an example that according 
to the neoclassical growth theory, export expansion could 
stimulate economic growth because it promotes specialisa-
tion and raises factor productivity.
Studying the determinants of the institutional quality 
and their impact on the economic growth in the countries 
of Central and North-Eastern Africa, Kandil (2009) states 
that the institutional quality worsens with GDP growth per 
capita in these countries, a higher credit rating and higher 
openness degree improve the institutional quality.
Besides, the scientist in the paper “Environmental per-
formance and institutions quality: evidence from developed 
and developing countries” that a high quality of institutions 
significantly enhance an environmental performance in de-
veloped countries (Dkhili 2018).
Valeriani and Peluso (2011) focus their attention on 
two aspects: 1) influence of the institutional quality on the 
economic growth, 2) dependence of the institutional qual-
ity influence on the countries’ (institutions’) development 
degree. According to their conclusions, the difference in 
institutions’ impact on the developing and developed coun-
tries’ economic development is that various constituents 
(indicators) of the institutional quality show a different 
degree of the influence on the economic growth for differ-
ent countries. 
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The recognition of the institutions’ significant role to pro-
vide the social and economic development is confirmed by re-
searches of their interconnection with other factors of develop-
ment, particularly with social capital (Kaasa 2016), innovations 
(Kaasa et al. 2007). Hall (2015) showed that β-convergence 
in economic freedom occurred from 1980 to 2010. And be-
sides, the structural characteristics that contribute to this in-
stitutional convergence are documented. The problem of the 
social development and institutions’ role is studied by Harshad 
(2017a, 2017b). Iqbal (2018) states that the human develop-
ment is an elemental part of the production and economic 
growth. Jayasundera (2017) shows the human development; a 
phenomenon that changes rapidly and a methodical study that 
helps to acquire knowledge and investigated the development 
of trade and economy in ancient Sri Lanka.
Thus, most empiric researches study the institutional 
quality in the interconnection with economic growth. In 
general, one can make a conclusion that the institutional 
quality relates to economic growth. As a rule, researchers 
make the general assumption that high institutional quality 
positively influences economic growth, i.e. the economic 
growth is observed as a variable which depends on the in-
stitutional quality. The institutional changes can be classi-
fied according to such characteristics as duration, resource 
constraints, direction of changes and number of stages 
(Shvindina 2017: 74-82). According to the study the lead-
ership is a key component of transformation and it should 
be considered as a multifactor model.
In the context of regulation Kaufmann et al. (2010), 
Cavalcanti and Novo (2005) study relationships between 
regulating institutions and economic development. 
Particularly, they give the relevant evaluations for six gov-
ernance constituents.
Kostel et al. (2017) states that institution play a great role 
in social, economic and political progress of the country. In 
2016 meeting of the High-Level Political Forum (HLPF), 
mandated to follow up and review the implementation of 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development took place 
in New York. Several speakers noted that “institutions mat-
ter”– with some stating that strong, stable and mature in-
stitutions are crucial for the implementation of the SDGs 
(Kostel et al. 2017: 80).
As a rule, the institutions’ convergence is studied with 
reference to the development of countries, which are at 
the stage of their social and economic models’ transfor-
mations, particularly countries – candidates to the EU 
members (Bartlett et al. 2013). Hájek et al. (2016), Elert 
and Halvarsson (2012) investigate the institutional con-
vergence between countries in the long-term perspective. 
Schönfelder and Wagner (2018) investigate the institutional 
convergence in Europe.
The institutional complementarity as the theoretical 
concept is used to explain the institutional changes, insti-
tutions’ evolution (Boyer 2005, 2007, Amable 2016). 
The institutional changes as factors of social and eco-
nomic development are studied by (Draskovic et al. 2017). 
The macroeconomic stability issues and its institutional 
principles are investigated by (Vasilyeva et al. 2018b). 
Lunyakov et al. (2013) study the cyclic dynamics of the so-
cial and economic development and institutional changes, 
that accompany it. The study of Logan and Esmanov (2017) 
showed that the institutes of state financial control con-
stantly undergo organizational changes, which, of course, 
affect the effectiveness of their functioning.
According to Rogowski (2017) concepts such as norms, 
organizations and institutions are needed in every economy 
to stabilize it.
Pagano (2011) studies historical peculiarities regard-
ing the formation and development of institutions and ex-
plains the institutional changes through the institutional 
complementarity. In his opinion, the institutional comple-
mentarity study creates the base for effective transformation 
of institutions, enables to avoid the unexpected negative 
consequences.
The political and economic institutions’ dependence is 
confirmed by studies of (Bartlett et al. 2013, Yevdokimov 
et al. 2018). The political institutions, particularly politi-
cal stability, governmental accountability, responsibility 
chains, freedom of mass media and fighting corruption 
are important for configuration and functioning of the key 
economic institutions. Eicher and Schreiber (2010) make 
the “hypothesis of the institutional hierarchy”, that defines 
the dependence of the economic institutions on the quality 
of the political institutions. 
Tamilina L. and Tamilina N. (2014, 2017) explain the 
peculiarities of the institutions’ influence on the post-soviet 
countries’ growth through the nature of their origin – evo-
lutionary or revolutionary. The difference between revo-
lutionary and evolutionary processes to form institutions 
is a reason that post-socialist countries represent different 
dynamics of social and economic development. Their econ-
omy’s growth rates less probably depend on the economic 
institutions’ quality. At the same time, political institutions’ 
maturity is a determining factor. Thus, the idea regarding 
institutions’ hierarchy, where the basic level is presented by 
political institutions, is confirmed. 
Boyer (2005) supposes that the institutions’ complemen-
tarity hypothesis is the most appropriate to explain many 
factors in the economic policy, reforming in the post-so-
cialist countries. However, the evaluation of complementa-
rity is difficult, since the uncertainty and weakening of the 
relationship between different institutions require a com-
bination of methodologies to reveal the complementarity.
Concluding this short review, allows to allocate the most 
essential features of the institutional complementarity:
1) It is reasonable to observe the institutional com-
plementarity as a condition of the institutional 
changes’ efficiency. Thus, the institutional changes, 
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introduced with the aim to improve social welfare, 
have to be analyzed for the complementarity posi-
tion.
2) It is difficult to form the universal approach to the 
institutional complementarity evaluation since it al-
ways relates to the concrete institutional structure. 
So, the complementarity dimensions of institutions 
are defined by the concrete tasks and study’s context.
3) It is reasonable to study the complementarity in two 
planes: horizontal (compliance of institutions of one 
level) and vertical (compliance of the institutions 
from different countries with institutions of differ-
ent levels within the institutional structure in the 
relevant country).
Our  hypothesis is  the complementarity of institutions 
affects the quality of institutions of the social sector, in other 
words, the quality of institutions of the social sector depends 
on the institutions of regulation. We will evaluate the regu-
lating institutions based on the six dimensions governance1, 
which make World Governance Index.
In the process of the study, we face with the problem 
regarding the reduction of evaluations in the concrete in-
stitutions. Within the question about institutional quality 
dimensions choice, their representativeness, relevancy, 
there is a question: how do the narrowly focused assess-
ments answer the question?
2. Methodology and data
In order to carry out the empiric analysis, we create a pa-
nel of data, which enables to combine many observations 
by different countries considering the variables dynamics 
in time. It increases the number of freedom degrees and 
reduces the standard mistakes of the obtained assessments. 
Besides, using the panel data we can analyse the impact of 
the countries’ individual institutional features, which are 
constant in time. 
Following the classical analysis, at the first step, we will 
conduct direct evaluation of our model equation (Pooled 
OLS estimator), which ignores the panel nature of the data. 
Then we will evaluate the regression with random individ-
ual effect (Random effects estimator). In the third step, we 
will construct the model with determined individual ef-
fect (Fixed effects or within estimator). We will compare 
these three models in order to understand which of them is 
more convenient for our data. Using the Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects and Hausman 
test for fixed versus random effects model in the process of 
1  Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority 
in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments 
are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government 
to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect 
of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them (Kaufmann et al. 2010).
models’ comparison, we will select the model with the best 
quality of assessments. The models will be evaluated with 
the help of the program STATA 13.0.
The panel, which we will use for testing, includes data for 
8 years during 2007–2014. We use indicators of 20 countries 
in the analysis. The following aspects are taken into account 
in the formation of the countries’ list:
1) A direct connection between institutions and the 
countries’ economic development. A lot of stud-
ies confirm that economically developed countries 
traditionally have stable and mature institutions. 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) determine that in-
stitutions’ improvement by 1% provides the growth 
of the labour efficiency in average by 5%. 
2) The quality of relationships between institutions and 
economic growth also depends on the way how in-
stitutions are formed (evolutionary and revolution-
ary). Tamilina and Tamilina (2014) conclude that a 
positive impact of the economic institutions on the 
economic growth is higher, when such institutions 
are formed in an evolutionary way, but not as a result 
of the revolutionary changes. Besides, the quality of 
the formal institutions greatly depends on the quality 
of the national political system for countries with a 
revolutionary way of institutions’ formation.
3) Statistic observations data for the analysis period.
Thus, the list of countries, which are included in the list 
considering the above parameters, is presented in Table 1.
We will evaluate the quality of the social sector institu-
tions via the Institutional Quality Index of social sector. 
The formation of this index is based on the social meas-
ures of outcomes without consideration of the economic 
Table 1. Grouping of the countries, which are included in the 
panel data (author’s investigation)
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indicators of costs and social expenditures. This indicator is 
multidimensional. This index includes 20 indicators of the 
social sector functioning efficiency, which are united into 
three groups: education, health and social protection. The 
weighted coefficients of each indicator is defined through 
the Principal component analysis. The implementation of 
these official statistic observations in the index formation 
increases the objectivity of evaluation in comparison with 
other indicators, which are based on the expert evaluations.
The evaluation of basic institutions’ quality is one of 
the key problems in the study of their establishment and 
transformation interconnections with economic develop-
ment on the whole or separate constituents of the social 
and economic systems. Studying the institutional develop-
ment researchers have formed and have used many indexes. 
Some of them are classified as objective indexes and provide 
the evaluation of the political institutions’ quality through 
Measures of Political Instability and Violence. These indica-
tors were built on the basis of various political occurrences 
(demonstrations, crimes, strikes, etc). Since there were no 
alternatives, they were tried to be used for approximation to 
other institutions’ evaluation, that caused the assessments 
shift (Williams and Siddique 2008). 
The second group is considered as the subjective in-
dexes, which are based on the aggregated evaluations of the 
national experts and surveys. Freedom House Index of Civil 
and Political Liberties, International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) 
are the most popular indices, used in the researches. While 
forming these indices, some aspects of countries’ social and 
economic and political development such as the rule of law, 
the corruption level or its acceptance level, bureaucracy 
were evaluated. The key problem consists in the fact that 
they were not developed with the purpose to analyse institu-
tions, and there is criticism regarding the methodology of 
their construction (Williams and Siddique 2008). 
Recently, the composite indexes have become popular. 
They combine a lot of indicators, obtained from different 
bases, that reduces the aggregation mistakes to the global in-
dex. Transparency International (TI), and the World Bank’s 
Governance Indicators are the most popular today. The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) by Kaufmann is 
the most appropriate for our aims. Its creation is aimed at 
evaluation of the governance, which consists of the tradi-
tions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised (Kaufmann et al. 2010). 
The methodology of its formation provides six dimen-
sions of the institutional quality that enables to define the 
connection and the impact of every dimension on the insti-
tutional quality of the social sector. Thus, we will construct 
six regressions, where every constituent WGI (Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/
Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law, Control of Corruption) will be the independent 
variable, in order to research the complementarity of the 
basic institutions and social institutions. 
As control variables, the impact of which is defined, we 
use the GDP per capita, as the indicator of the countries’ 
economic development and GINI coefficient, which defies 
the inequality level. The relation between the parameters of 
social institutions’ quality is justified by the correlation coef-
ficients and Institutional Quality Index of the social sector. 
The list of indicators, which will be used in the construc-
tion of the regression, are given in Table 2.
In order to take into account, the possible fluctuations of 
indicators in time and the influence of the difference in the 
countries’ social and economic development indicators and 
way to form the institutions, we will use the time Dummy 
and Dummy variables regarding the country’s group.
Thus, the models, evaluated by us, will be shown in the 
following way:
  
(1)
Table 2. Description of the regression variables (source: 
authors’ compilation)
Variable Type of Variable Designation
Institutional Quality 
Index of social sector Dependent IQSS
Voice and Accountability Independent 1 VOICE
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/
Terrorism
Independent 2 POLSTAB
Government 
Effectiveness Independent 3 GOVEFFEC
Regulatory Quality Independent 4 REGQUAL
Rule of Law Independent 5 RULE OF LAW
Control of Corruption Independent 6 CORRUPT
GINI Index Control GINI
Gross Domestic Product Control GDPPERCAP
Year dummy 2007 Dummy y2007
Year dummy 2008 Dummy y2008
Year dummy 2009 Dummy y2009
Year dummy 2010 Dummy y2010
Year dummy 2011 Dummy y2011
Year dummy 2012 Dummy y2012
Year dummy 2013 Dummy y2013
Country dummy 1 Dummy c1
Country dummy 2 Dummy c2
Country dummy 3 Dummy c3
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(2)
  
(3)
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3. Results
The analysis of the descriptive statistics confirms the data 
uniformity. The correlation values checking did not reveal 
multicollinearity of independent variables (maximum value 
was –0.76 – correlation between indicators Institutional 
Quality Index of the social sector and GINI Index). Besides, 
the correlation analysis confirms reasonability GINI Index 
and Gross Domestic Product to be included into the regres-
sion as control variables (Figure 1). As we can see from the 
figure, only 7 of 20 countries have the correlation between 
Institutional Quality Index of the social sector and GINI 
Index less than 30%. The direct and indirect connection 
between indicators is peculiar for every group, therefore 
the selected countries shared equally. The calculated cor-
relation coefficient by all countries (cross-country) on the 
data of 2014 is (–0.764). This value is similar to the obtained 
results (Chong and Gradstein 2007). In their work authors 
defined the essential correlation between indicators of the 
institutional quality and inequality level and identified the 
direct dependence between the institutions’ weakness level 
and inequality in the country. 
The program STATA 13.0 helps us to evaluate the inde-
pendent, control and Dummy variables. As a result, every of 
six regressions was evaluated through three models Pooled 
OLS estimator, Random effects estimator, Fixed effects or 
within estimator (Appendix 1, 2).
The selection of the adequate model is based on the 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random 
effects and Hausman test for fixed versus random effects 
model, the results are shown in the Table 3.
On the next stage we will analyse the fitting of the model 
and statistical significance of the obtained evaluations.
Fixed effect models, selected as the most appropriate 
models to check the dependence of the social institutions’ 
quality on the following governance dimensions Control 
of Corruption, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, 
Voice and Accountability, showed the low quality of the 
fitting. The determination coefficients (R2) of the models 
are 0.114, 0.111, 0.115 respectively. It means that only 11% 
of the Institutional Quality Index of social sector variation 
may be explained by the independent variables. Most of the 
variation accounts for the individual effects for countries 
(rho is approximately 0,98), however, the correlation be-
tween individual effects and regressors is low. 
For purpose to estimate the Regulatory Quality the 
statistical significance could be р < 10%. The random ef-
fect which was defined as the most adequate to check 
Figure 1. The correlation coefficients between the Institutional Quality Index of the social 
sector and GINI Index (source: authors’ calculation)
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the dependence of the social institutions’ quality on the 
following dimensions of the governance – Government 
Effectiveness and Rule of Law. The model’s quality is evalu-
ated not by the determination coefficients but based on the 
Wald test. The obtained values of the Wald chi2 prove the 
normal quality of the models. The requirement regarding 
the absence of the correlation between individual random 
effects and regressors is fulfilled.
Conclusions 
Is the question regarding the quality of institutions of the 
social sector debatable today? Besides, the analysing of the 
social sector as a part of the market economy is an ano-
maly if you understand it from the position of classical 
economic theory. However, today, at the transnational level 
European Social Charter, which as an institution forms 
path dependence regarding the economic development 
of the most European countries, is acting. It means that 
nowadays, there is a social framework, in relation to which 
the economic institutions are formed. That is why, studying 
the quality of the social institutions, we put the question: 
does this quality depends on the basic institutions, repre-
senting them via six key dimensions of Governance: “Voice 
and Accountability”, “Political Stability”, “Government 
Effectiveness”, “Regulatory Quality”, “Rule of Law” “Control 
of Corruption”, i.e., is there the institutional complemen-
tarity between institutions of this type? 
According to results of the panel data analysis, it has 
been defined that the impact on the institutional qual-
ity “Voice and Accountability”, “Political Stability” and 
“Control of Corruption” is not statistically significant. Such 
results regarding the first two dimensions of Governance are 
clear in general because the analysed countries demonstrate 
the already formed social standards system, which does 
not depend on the citizens’ possibility to select the govern-
ment or political destabilization. So, the institutions of the 
social sector are stable in relation to the political instability 
or the citizens’ freedoms oppressions (freedom of media, 
freedom of association, freedom of expression). As for the 
“Control of Corruption”, the absence of the influence may 
be explained, firstly, by the IQSS structure (indicators, in-
cluded in its structure, are not “sensitive” to the corruption), 
secondly, this indicator is reasonable to be analysed by the 
Rule of Law, since the trusting degree to the determined 
rules, including the judicial authorities, police etc, is defined 
by this indicator. 
Among all regulation dimensions “Rule of Law” and 
“Regulatory Quality” reveal the statistically significant di-
rect impact on the IQSS. It may confirm the complementa-
rity of basic institutions and institutions of the social sector. 
The trusting level to the law, its following and quality of 
the social sector, the ability of the government to provide 
sound policy and regulation that enables to promote pri-
vate sector development is a representative constituent of 
institutions, including the economic ones, which form the 
institutional base.
The results of the evaluation by the indicator Government 
Effectiveness were quite controversial since this indicator 
does not have a statistically significant impact on the so-
cial institutional quality. The GINI coefficient and GDP per 
capita, included in the analysis of these variables, are signifi-
cant. It may justify that Government Effectiveness indicator 
also is a result of the incomes distribution inequality impact 
and general economic welfare. It is necessary to carry out 
additional studies of the above parameters’ interconnection 
for more fundamental conclusions.
Let us notice that all conclusions are fair for four groups 
of countries. 
We understand the limitation of the proposed meth-
odology to evaluate the institutional complementarity. In 
the approach, which we propose, the informal institutions 
are out of the analysis, although they may have great in-
fluence on the development of the social sector. Besides, 
our research is oriented to find the one-way connection of 
the regulatory institutions and social institutions’ quality, 
although more profound analysis of the complementarity 
requires the two-way communication evaluation. Although 
the problem of the complementarity dimension is compli-
cated, especially when it concerns the social sector, Deeg 
(2005: 5) points out that “selecting performance criteria 
Table 3. Selection of the adequate model through the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian and Hausman tests  
(source: authors’ calculation)
Test Voice and Accountability
Political Stability 
and Absence of 
Violence
Government 
Effectiveness
Regulatory 
Quality Rule of Law
Control of 
Corruption
Breusch-Pagan LM test for 
random effects versus OLS 
Null hypothesis
rejected rejected rejected rejected rejected rejected
Hausman test for fixed ver-
sus random effects model 
Null hypothesis
rejected rejected not rejected rejected not rejected rejected
Model chosen Fixed effect Fixed effect Random effects Fixed effect Random effects Fixed effect
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also grows more challenging when the complementarity of 
interest is social (e.g, trust, cooperation) or political (e.g., 
power) in nature. It may also be that our ability to meas-
ure complementarities will, in the end, be of a rather crude 
nature and thus we will, at best, only be able to ascertain 
with some certainty whether some kind of complementarity 
exists or does not”.
We suppose that the obtained results in the research 
could be used in the determination of the key points in the 
implementation of the reforms. Since the problem regarding 
institutions’ development is more urgent for the developing 
and transition countries than for the developed countries, it 
is reasonable to perform more detailed analysis of the insti-
tutions’ complementarity for countries, included to the 3d 
and 4th groups by us. The complementarity as a factor of the 
institutional quality is important for the economic policy, 
since the institutional changes, which have been already 
introduced or are planned to be implemented in the social 
sector, may be inappropriate with the current institutional 
structure and will not give the expected results. 
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